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Deterrence has many faces.1  It also raises many questions, and, in fact, 
there is a great deal about it that is not well known.  The basic assumption 
that bad consequences will prevent some people, in some way, from 
committing some crimes is widely shared,2 but the mechanism by which 
deterrence works remains elusive and so does the manner of administering 
the disincentives called for.  This article is an attempt to analyze theories 
about these issues and to project possible consequences. 
The first section of the article considers the simplest model of 
deterrence, which features an individual who considers the balance of 
advantages and disadvantages of committing a particular crime.  This 
version of deterrence might be called the economic or market model.  The 
theory depends upon at least four variables: the certainty of punishment; 
its severity; its delay (all of which determine the disadvantages); and, in 
comparison, the rewards of the crime.3  The potential criminal, by this 
reasoning, makes decisions in a way that is analogous to a shopper 
thinking about spending money to buy a good or service.  But the 
controlling factors depend upon the individual’s perceptions of four sets 
of probabilities, none of which are known to the actor with much 
precision.4 
The second section deals with related but arguably distinguishable 
phenomena.  For example, condemnation refers to the community’s 
collective repugnance in the face of crime.  It is both expressed and 
strengthened by criminal sentencing.  Condemnation is analogous to 
retributive justice, but it is less abstract because it operates through action 
that conveys principles.5  Incapacitation is yet another distinguishable 
effect of the criminal law, consisting of efforts to prevent the individual 
from being able to repeat his crimes, such as by imprisonment.6  These 
additional aspects of criminal sentencing are sometimes so intertwined 
with deterrence that it becomes difficult to separate the effects.  There are 
also extralegal deterrents—those that operate without the mediation of the 
legal system, but that can persuade the individual not to engage in criminal 
 
1. Compare infra Part IA, with Part IIC, and Part IIIA. 
2. See infra Part IIIA. 
3. See infra Part IA. 
4. See infra Part IB1. 
5. See infra Part IIA. 
6. See infra Part IIC. 
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activity—such as the predicted negative reactions of other people to the 
crime.7 
The third section deals with a more diffuse, but possibly more 
important, kind of deterrence—one that differs from the individualized 
economic model.  This effect might be called systemic deterrence.8  The 
individual in this model does not weigh the severity, certainty, or 
promptness of the punishment for the contemplated crime, but is deterred 
nevertheless by awareness of the criminal justice system as a whole.  The 
individual knows that, at some time, his activity may be detected and he 
may be arrested, with the possibility of more or less unpleasant 
consequences, but the individual does not calculate an estimate of these 
consequences for the individual crime.  Instead, the putative criminal 
considers the attitudes of those in the jurisdiction toward crime, generally.  
To the extent this theory reflects reality, the sentence customarily imposed 
for robbery or burglary is not the dominant factor deterring these crimes.  
Instead, it is the individual’s general perception of the effects of the 
criminal justice system, adjusted for the seriousness of the crime.  By this 
reasoning, one can hope that sentences imposed for one particular crime 
will deter others.  Sentences for murder, for example, can deter robberies, 
if the theory is accurate.9 
A final section sets out the author’s conclusions.  These include the 
observation that, although certainty of punishment is a greater factor than 
the length of a (nontrivial) sentence, sentence severity also deters in some 
cases, as well as the conjecture that systemic deterrence may be more 
important than it has been given credit for.  It may mean that vigorous and 
visible enforcement against the most serious crimes will deter many other 
crimes as well. 
By way of disclaimer, it should be added that this article does not usually 
distinguish between specific deterrence, deterrence of the sentenced 
individual, and general deterrence, the deterrence of others.  Most of the 
literature follows this pattern and does not distinguish between the two 
types.10  Statements and conclusions that are unattributed here are original 
formulations by the author.  A major effort of this article is to evaluate the 
 
7. See infra Part IIB. 
8. See infra Part III. 
9. See infra Part IIIC. 
10. See infra Part IIIA.  
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consequences of the surveys and experiments.  References to studies, of 
course, reflect the work of the criminologists who are cited. 
I.    THE ECONOMIC OR MARKET MODEL OF DETERRENCE 
A.    Certainty, Severity, Delay, and Reward: The Potential Criminal As Homo 
Economicus 
At least four factors—the certainty of punishment, its severity, its delay, 
and its reward—figure into the basic model of criminal deterrence.11  By 
this theory, the more certainty there is in detection, apprehension, 
conviction and sentence, the greater the deterrent.12  The logic behind the 
conjecture is that a high probability of punishment is a determinant of the 
cost of committing the contemplated crime.13  In the same way, the 
severity of the probable sanction is said to correlate with the probability 
that the crime will be costly.  For example, if there is a high probability of 
detection, apprehension, conviction and sentence, together with a severe 
expected punishment, the deterrent against the commission of a particular 
crime is greater than it would be if certainty and severity were lower,14 or 
so goes the theory. 
Cesare Beccaria, the father of modern sentencing philosophy, argued 
this kind of deterrence was the only proper end of criminal justice.15  
“The purpose of punishment, then, is nothing other than to dissuade the 
criminal from doing fresh harm to his compatriots and to keep other 
people from doing the same.”16  And the seriousness of punishment, he 
 
11. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal 
Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 992–95 (2003) (discussing these factors) 
[hereinafter Role of Deterrence]; see also Isaac Ehrlich, Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and 
Empirical Investigation, 81 J. POL. ECON. 521, 535 (1973) (discussing the first two factors, certainty and 
severity). 
12. See Role of Deterrence, supra note 11, at 992 (“The empirical studies seem to agree that 
increasing the probability of punishment provides a better chance of strengthening deterrence than 
increasing the severity of punishment.”). 
13. Id. at 979. 
14. See DAVID CRUMP ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND LAWYERING 
STRATEGIES 558 (3d ed. 2013) (analyzing the difference between modern punishment trends and the 
period of European history known as “the Enlightenment,” where “criminal punishment is generally 
understood to have revolved around execution or the infliction of pain on convicted defendants”). 
15. CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (David Young trans., 1986) (1764), 
as reprinted in DAVID CRUMP ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND LAWYERING 
STRATEGIES 558, 558 (3d ed. 2013). 
16. Id. 
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said, should be measured by this goal.17  “Therefore, punishments and the 
method of inflicting them should be chosen that, mindful of the 
proportion between crime and punishment, will make the most 
effective . . . impression on [people’s] minds.”18  Of course, others argued 
that this theory was incomplete or erroneous.19  Immanuel Kant, for 
example, considered the utilitarian goal of deterrence improper; instead, 
“[t]he law of punishment is a categorical imperative.”20  “Punishment by a 
court,” he wrote, “can never be inflicted merely as a means to promote 
some other good for the criminal himself or for civil society.”21  Instead, it 
must be measured “by the principle of retribution.”22 
At least one judge has put three of the factors underlying deterrence 
into a mathematical equation, or rather an inequality, while realizing it 
cannot be treated as having mathematical exactitude.23  The inequality 
considers the factor of relative certainty as a probability that is to be 
multiplied by average or typical severity to determine the disadvantage or 
cost of committing the object crime.24  The inequality, then, tests the 
deterrent by considering whether: 
     C x S > R, 
where C is the probability of punishment, S is its severity, and R is the 
reward expected from the crime.25  C, presumably, is a probability with a 
value between 0.0 and 1.0, with 0.0 meaning no probability of punishment 
and 1.0 meaning absolute certainty of punishment.  If the product on the 
left side of the inequality exceeds the reward, deterrence operates to 
 
17. See DAVID CRUMP, supra note 14, at 558 (“Beccaria argued both that deterrence was the 
overriding goal of sentencing and that it represented a humane alternative to existing practices.”). 
18. CESARE BECCARIA, supra note 15, at 558. 
19. See DAVID CRUMP, supra note 14, at 567 (exploring Immanuel Kant’s “retributive theory 
of punishment” in which “[p]unishment is matched to the crime and the offender” and punishing 
someone to serve as an example to others is prohibited).  
20. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary Gregor trans., 1991) (1797), as 
reprinted in DAVID CRUMP ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND LAWYERING 
STRATEGIES  568, 568 (3d ed. 2013).  
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. See, e.g., United States v. Corchado-Aguirre, No. CR 15–0393 JB, 2015 WL 10383207, 
at *15 (D.N.M. Aug. 31, 2015) (noting for such a theory to work, “several factors—many of which 
would vary from person to person—would need to be established”).  
24. Id. 
25. See id. (using “F” for “fruits of the crime” rather than “R”). 
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suppress the crime.26  One should immediately add that the mathematics, 
such as they are, should in theory operate even if C x S is less than R; the 
result, then, is simply that the deterrent administered by the sentence is 
not, alone, sufficient to dissuade the criminal from seeking the expected 
reward.27  In that event, there are other factors resulting from the criminal 
justice system, including indirect and extralegal factors that can combine 
with the residual deterrent to prevent the crime.28   
Judge Posner has developed a numerical example of the operation of 
this theory.29  This approach features an intense focus on economic costs 
and benefits.  Posner notes that some criminal acts are “wealth-
maximizing,” and postulates that responses should be calibrated so that 
the product of certainty times severity exceeds the reward in mathematical 
terms: 
Once the expected punishment cost for the crime has been set, it becomes 
necessary to choose a combination of probability and severity of 
punishment that will bring that cost home to the would-be offender.  Let us 
begin with fines.  An expected punishment cost of $1000 can be imposed by 
combining a fine of $1000 with a probability of apprehension and 
conviction of one [i.e., absolute certainty], a fine of $10,000 with a 
probability of .1, a fine of one million dollars with a probability of .001, 
etc.30 
The argument was merely illustrative, and Posner recognized that it was 
subject to the limits of the underlying model as well as, presumably, 
opposing goals such as proportionality and uniformity.31 
Acceptance of the economic market theory has been widespread.32  
Isaac Ehrlich writes that: 
 
26. See id. (providing an equation recognizing an individual will not commit a crime if the 
fruits received in committing the crime are outweighed by the certainty and severity of punishment).  
Judge Browning recognized the inaccuracy of this simple mathematical expression, and found it 
would require multiple “conversion factors.”  Id. 
27. Id. at *16. 
28. See infra Part IIC. 
29. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 
1193, 1206 (1985) (detailing, in numerical terms, the balance between probability and severity of 
punishment needed to sufficiently deter a criminal act).  
30. Id. 
31. See id. at 1230–31 (reserving “moral” issues for “another day”). 
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[The] “market model” . . . builds on the assumption that offenders, as 
members of the human race, respond to incentives. . . .  [T]his has been the 
justification for applying economic analysis to all illegal activities, from 
speeding and tax evasion to murder. . . .  At least in the economic literature, 
there has been little controversy concerning this approach.33  
Others, like Anthony Doob and Cheryl Webster, actually see the market or 
economic model as having limited validity,34 and this article discusses that 
position in a later section.35 
In any event, the version of the mathematical inequality above omits the 
factor of delay,36 which, therefore, needs to be added.  Apparently, no one 
has revised the symbolic inequality so that it reflects delay as well as 
certainty and severity.37  This factor, delay, has been studied less than the 
other determinants in the model, probably because it is more difficult to 
analyze by natural experiments.38  But it is apparent that delay weakens a 
deterrent.39  This is the reason that merchants advertise goods by 
promising “no money down” or that there need be “no payments until 
next year.”   
The question arises, then, how should delay be figured into the 
inequality that expresses the relationship among C, S, and R?  Because 
delay, D, reduces the deterrent flowing from enforcement of a particular 
law, and the deterrent presumably lessens, at least roughly, according to 
the length of any delay, it theoretically should be represented as a divisor 
 
32. See, e.g., Isaac Ehrlich, Crime, Punishment, and the Market for Offenses, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 43, 
43 (1996) (referencing Becker, Fleisher, Tullock, Rottenberg, and others as those who have done 
similar economic analysis). 
33. Id. at 43–44. 
34. See generally Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl Marie Webster, Sentence Severity and Crime: Accepting 
the Null Hypothesis, 30 CRIME & JUST. 143, 143 (2003) [hereinafter Accepting the Null Hypothesis] 
(postulating sentence severity has little to no effect on the level of crime, and, therefore, does not 
deter crime).  Their title says so, in that the “null hypothesis” is that the effect at issue does not exist.  
Id. 
35. See infra Part IB1.  
36. See United States v. Corchado-Aguirre, No. CR 15–0393 JB, 2015 WL 10383207, at *15 
(D.N.M. Aug. 31, 2015) (limiting the inequality to probability, severity, and expected reward); Role of 
Deterrence, supra note 11, at 994 (explaining the relevance of delay and its possible impact on the 
deterrent effect).  
37. See, e.g., Corchado-Aguirre, 2015 WL 10383207, at *15 (utilizing a symbolic inequality which 
represents only probability, severity, and benefit). 
38. In other words, comparing records about delay is difficult. 
39. Role of Deterrence, supra note 11, at 994 (2003). 
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of the C x S product.  We might construct a mathematical relationship, 
then, that would predict a deterrent if: 
     C x S 
    ———   >    R. 
        D        
If this relationship holds, the strength of the deterrent is proportional to 
the certainty of punishment, multiplied by the severity of the expected 
punishment, divided by the length of the delay before its imposition.  If 
the result is greater than the anticipated reward, deterrence operates to 
suppress the crime.  But this proposition is highly theoretical, and the 
mathematics are intended to show only the relationship, not quantities. 
From these ideas, one can evaluate some kinds of possible deterrents.  
For many crimes, the weakest ingredient of deterrence is the probability of 
apprehension, which is a determinant of the certainty of punishment.40  If 
this factor can be increased, the likelihood of punishment grows, and thus 
the deterrence of crime is stronger.41  Empirical observation supports this 
conclusion.42  Policies that increase police presence in a community, 
therefore, should be expected to reduce crimes such as robbery or 
burglary, because of the greater certainty of detection and apprehension.43  
Increased severity, too, may increase the deterrent in some cases.44  Such 
statutes as use-a-gun-go-to-jail laws increase the severity of the targeted 
type of crime, and studies suggest that the deterrent effects result in a 
decrease in offense rates.45  Likewise, decreasing delays should result in 
 
40. See Roy E. L. Watson, The Effectiveness of Increased Police Enforcement As a General Deterrent, 
20 L. & SOC’Y REV. 293, 293 (1986) (“This skepticism has been supported by the failure of empirical 
studies, especially those based on official records of crimes and of the apprehension of offenders, to 
provide convincing evidence of the deterrent effect of legal penalties.”). 
41. See id. at 299 (suggesting increasing awareness of the threat of punishment may lead to 
greater compliance with the law).  
42. Id. 
43. See, e.g., id. at 297 (showing, through a graph, that increased police presence at phase two 
of the same will lead to greater apprehension). 
44. Certainty, however, is usually the real controlling factor.  See infra Part IB2. 
45. See, e.g., Naomi Harlin Goodno, Career Criminals Targeted: The Verdict is in, California’s Three-
Strikes Law Proves Effective, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 461, 469–71 (2007) (“[S]everal studies and 
surveys have concluded that the Three Strikes law has had a deterrent effect.”). 
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greater deterrence.46  The addition of courts and personnel to provide 
more speedy trials, then, will decrease crime too.47  To the extent that the 
death penalty is a deterrent, if it is, the Federal Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act, which was intended to reduce delays between the time 
of sentence and its execution,48 should have been expected to increase any 
possible deterrent effect of capital punishment—again, if it exists. 
All of this reasoning, however, is subject to real-world effects, which are 
substantial.  The market model appears more precise than it really is.  
There are factors that it cannot account for, and these factors are great 
enough to make the model useless in many cases, as the next section of 
this article will show.  The confounding variables include, first, the 
dependence of all three deterrence factors on the perceptions of the 
individual actor.49  Second, there are instances in which a rational choice 
model loses predictive value because actors do not choose rationally.50  
Third, there are contrary tendencies buried in the determinants.51  Fourth, 
there are differences in the influence of each of the factors, as well as 
differences that vary with the extent of each, and the marginal effects of 
the factors tend to weaken as they increase.52  As a result, the market or 
economic model is subject to serious criticisms. 
 
46. See Role of Deterrence, supra note 11, at 994 (“[W]hen punishment is imposed, the strength of 
the punishment memory—that is, its recalled punitive ‘bite’ as a perceived threat for a future 
violation—is dramatically reduced as the length of delay increases.”).  
47. See id. (increasing resources might reduce delay and thereby increase deterrent effects). 
48. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1966).  The Act requires that state court decisions be given the benefit 
of the doubt.  Id.  This standard provides simpler affirmance.  Hardy v. Cross, 565 U.S. 65, 66 (2011). 
49. See Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal Deterrence?, 100 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765, 776 (2010) (lamenting the fact that “[a] law can have no deterrent 
influence upon a potential criminal if he is unaware of its existence.” (quoting John C. Ball, The 
Deterrence Concept in Criminology and Law, 46 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 347, 351 
(1995))). 
50. See id. at 819 (finding this system incapable of being exploited by the justice system, 
because, even if offenders chose rationally, they “rationally readjust their perceptions of the risk of 
sanctions and reduce their offending”).  
51. See id. at 810 (suggesting factors such as whether an individual is “poorly informed about 
the likelihood of detection” and his “perceptions of sanction threats” are just a few of the “number 
of obstacles to effective deterrence”). 
52. See, e.g., id. at 790 (“[I]n cities in which a higher proportion of robberies resulted in an 
arrest, the robbery rate [is] lower.”). 
9
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B.    Criticisms of the Economic Model 
1.    Perception and Rational Choices: Does a Person Contemplating 
Crime Function As Homo Economicus? 
The market model is a product of the kind of thinking engaged in by 
economists.53  Scholars of economics base their diagrams, equations, and 
laws on several assumptions, none of which fits the world perfectly.54  
The most basic of these assumptions is that actors making economic 
decisions fit a mold called “homo economicus,” the economic person, and 
that they make unfailingly rational choices.55  Homo economicus is always 
fully informed, so that he or she knows the intricacies of every product 
and service, from automobiles to heart surgery.56  Furthermore, homo 
economicus always makes rational choices and never has to puzzle over 
whether to buy vanilla, strawberry, or chocolate, or for that matter, to buy 
a Chevrolet, Jeep, or Cadillac.57 
Obviously, not all people, tempted to commit crimes, think so 
precisely—for that matter, neither do consumers in economic markets.58  
Homo economicus is as imaginary as the reasonable person in negligence 
law: a construct upon which to base approximate (very approximate) 
 
53. One of the basic articles on deterrence in the modern era was the work of an economist.  
Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968); see also 
Raymond Paternoster, supra note 49, at 778 (explaining an economist’s analysis stems from the 
realization that crime is committed due to the rational self-interest of individuals based on their 
individualized costs incurred or benefits received in committing the crime). 
54. See DAVID CRUMP, HOW TO REASON: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY THINKER’S TOOLKIT 
119–20 (2d ed. 2014) [hereinafter HOW TO REASON] (“Although economics obviously has useful 
predictive and normative applications, there are scholars who argue that it is incomplete and 
misleading . . . .  [S]ocioeconomics regards economics . . . as inadequate to explain actual marketplace 
behavior.”). 
55. See id. at 91 (suggesting homo economicus represents the ideal, “fully sophisticated 
consumer in a market economy [who] is able to purchase precisely that mix of goods and services 
that produces the most satisfaction of that individual’s wants and needs”). 
56. See id. at 118–19 (“[Homo economicus] is perfectly knowledgeable, never fooled, discerns 
utility infallibly, and always acts from pure self-interest, never from altruism.”).  
57. See id. at 119 (hypothesizing the view that the homo economicus does not labor over 
options, because he “discerns utility infallibly”). 
58. See id. (providing the example of Richard H. Thaler’s experiment, which demonstrated that 
“real consumers are sometimes guided by their perceptions of social appropriateness or fairness 
rather than by economic factors such as market price or economic utility, even when they make 
ostensibly economic choices”). 
10
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thinking.59  As such, homo economicus is useful in supporting the kinds 
of supply and demand curves that economists hypothesize.60  The curves 
can be replicated by data from the real world, but only loosely.61  
Likewise, the model of deterrence that depends upon a relationship among 
certainty, severity, delay, and reward can be expected to correspond only 
loosely, if at all, to the real world.  The assumption of such a 
correspondence might be said to depend upon a mythical being called 
“homo legalis,” or the law-centered person.62  The question then arises: in 
what way does the economic model vary from deterrence in the real 
world? 
In the first place, the economic model depends upon the putative 
criminal’s knowledge.63  That is to say, it is the individual’s perception of 
the likelihood, timing, and severity of possible punishment that counts, not 
the formal statute defining the crime and its possible sentence, which few 
citizens have read firsthand.64  Unfortunately, an experimenter’s focus on 
perception is, for the most part, relatively recent,65 undertaken long after 
research began on simpler deterrence theories.  At least one experiment, 
however, suggests an answer that provides bad news for the market or 
economic model.66  The researchers surveyed people to learn about their 
awareness of criminal laws in their states.67  The questions, among others, 
 
59. See id. at 118 (“Homo economicus is an idealized construct, invented to make economic 
theory workable.”). 
60. See id. at 120 (deducing that the socioeconomic-type behavior of the homo economicus 
does not result in outcomes which violate economic assumptions or predictions). 
61. See, e.g., Jayson Lusk, Real World Demand Curves, JAYSON LUSK: BLOG (Sept. 10, 2016), 
http://jaysonlusk.com/blog/2016/9/10/real-world-deman-curves [http://perma.cc/XA89-FED2] 
(providing examples of real world demand curves and graphs on agriculture and the economy).  
62. See Richard O’Sullivan, A Scale of Values in the Common Law, 1 MOD. L. REV. 27, 31 (1937) 
(emphasizing homo legalis was created by the Common Law and stands for “the reasonable man of 
the law” who will utilize his own free will when acting).  
63. See Raymond Paternoster, supra note 49, at 804 (relying on knowledge to create a deterrent 
effect). 
64. See generally Kirk R. Williams & Richard Hawkins, Perceptual Research on General Deterrence: A 
Critical Review, 20 L. & SOC’Y REV. 545, 545 (1986) [hereinafter Perceptual Research on General Deterrence] 
(“Deterrence theory implies a psychological process whereby individuals are deterred from 
committing criminal acts only if they perceive legal sanctions as certain, swift, and/or severe.”). 
65. See id. at 546 (recognizing previous attempts to isolate a deterrent effect have glossed over 
the perceptual process implied by a theory of general deterrence). 
66. See Paul H. Robinson et al., The Ex Ante Function of the Criminal Law, 35 L. & SOC’Y REV. 
165, 169 (2001) (detailing the test on whether elements of the criminal code “provide the bright lines 
that set off criminal conduct from allowable conduct”). 
67. Id. at 172–73. 
11
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included whether it was illegal, in the particular state, to “stand one’s 
ground” before using deadly force rather than retreat, and whether the law 
required people to aid someone in distress if they could do so without risk 
to themselves.68  The results indicated that people in the general 
population were ignorant of the answers.69 
This kind of experiment certainly demonstrates that persons 
contemplating crime are not perfectly knowledgeable about the criminal 
law and the assumption that homo economicus (or homo legalis) does not 
hold in all cases.70  This result does not mean, however, that people are 
completely without perceptions of the law of crimes and sentences.71  The 
questions in that experiment dealt with issues at the borderland of the 
criminal law—issues that varied sharply from state to state.72  If, instead, 
the questions had centered upon universally appreciated crimes, the results 
would have been different.73  What if the experimenters had asked: 
“Would a person violate the law if he broke into a random home and shot 
and killed the homeowner without provocation?” or “is it illegal to stick a 
pistol into the face of a convenience store clerk in order to take money 
from the cash register?”  To these questions, every survey participant 
would have the right answer, and every one could probably guess that the 
sentences provided by the law for these offenses included the possibility of 
long periods of incarceration.  Still, the experiment is useful.  Many crimes 
are defined in subtle ways and many sentences are not easy to predict.74  
The experiment shows that the economic model is not likely to be useful 
for these kinds of crimes.75 
In fact, people’s perceptions about the crimes of robbery and murder 
may not be based on a familiarity with the law at all.  Another survey 
 
68. Id. at 170–71. 
69. Id. at 183.  
70. See id. at 181–82 (discussing the effects of a study showing that people do not always act 
with absolute knowledge of the law but instead act based on what they think the law is, regardless of 
whether it is rational); see also HOW TO REASON, supra note 54, at 119 (analyzing the fact that homo 
economicus is to always act in a rational manner).  
71. See Paul H. Robinson et al., supra note 66, at 181 (suggesting people are unaware of the 
laws of their states, but were able to tell the surveyors “what they thought those laws were”). 
72. Id. at 182. 
73. See id. at 183 (hypothesizing results would have differed had the experiment asked about 
more generally accepted crimes). 
74. See id. at 181–83 (discussing various factors that make sentencing predictions difficult). 
75. See id. at 183 (revealing people are often wrong about the law, and even when they are not 
sure what the law is, they will assume it is one way or another based on their own moral code, rather 
than on any knowledge of the actual consequences that arise out of a violation of the law).  
12
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showed that participants imagined the law to be consistent with their 
moral inclinations.76  In other words, a person thinking about a particular 
harmful course of action is likely to consider it lawful or unlawful 
according to whether the person believes it is wrong enough to be 
criminal, rather than according to acquaintance with the law.77  
Presumably, the individual also imagines an estimated sentence, according 
to an internal sense of its degree of immorality.78  The possible conclusion 
from these results is that sentencing “for deterrence” is likely to be inferior 
to sentencing for just-deserts distribution.79  In other words, rather than 
asking whether a given sentence “will reduce crime,” a legislature or 
sentencing entity would better succeed by asking, “is this sentence 
consistent with principles of retributive justice?” 
There is a second step in considering the economic model of 
deterrence, and that is to ask whether people contemplating law violations 
really make rational choices.80  In the economic realm, Thaler’s 
experiment shows that often, consumers do not make rational choices.81  
Thaler asked survey participants to picture themselves at a beach, wanting 
a bottle of beer (or, what might be as effective, a soft drink for those who 
do not like beer).82  Your friend is going to make a run to the nearest 
place to buy the beverage.83  Your friend then asks, “What is the 
maximum price you would be willing to pay for this commodity?”84  Here, 
Thaler divided the participants into two groups.85  Half were told that the 
beverage would come from a luxurious resort hotel, and half were told that 
it would be bought at a mom-and-pop-style grocery store.86  Theoretically, 
homo economicus would not care; the marginal utility of the beer (or soft 
 
76. Id. 
77. See id. (reporting on people’s perspective regarding their state law, which can be based on 
each person’s particular moral beliefs). 
78. Role of Deterrence, supra note 11, at 981. 
79. Id. at 1002. 
80. See HOW TO REASON, supra note 54, at 119–20 (reviewing Thaler’s experiment which 
examined people’s preference to social fairness rather than economic utility).  
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 119. 
        84. See id. (identifying the economic question as one that determines what the highest amount 
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drink) would not change because of its source.87  But participants were 
willing to pay a significantly higher price for the beverage that came from 
the resort hotel.88  It takes a convoluted notion of economics to consider 
the beer from the hotel has greater marginal utility.89  The more likely 
conclusion is that the consumer is not homo economicus and does not 
always make choices according to a balance of costs and benefits.90 
Along the same line, experiments by game theorists demonstrate that 
human beings have a tendency to vary from rational choices, sometimes 
with surprising results.91  Experimenters have had subjects play zero-sum 
games (in which everything won is lost by the other competitor), as well as 
mixed-motive games (in which the competitors seek their own rewards but 
must take account of the opponent’s probable strategy with at least 
minimal cooperation),92 and they have had subjects play games in which 
both parties, by cooperating, can win maximum rewards for each.93  The 
maximizing difference game is an example.94  By both parties choosing 
the same square on the game board, they can maximize each of their 
expected payoffs.95  The rational strategy of both players, therefore, is to 
choose that square repeatedly, thereby collecting the maximum payment 
from the experimenter.96  The game is of no interest to pure game 
theorists; the strategy is trivial.97  But, it is of some interest to those who 
study the psychology of game players.98  
Some participants, although they know the rational strategy, deliberately 
select the wrong square from time to time, meaning a lesser payoff to both 
 
87. See id. at 119–20 (finding the conclusion of the study—willingness to pay different prices 
for the same drink based on the source of purchase—“bends the economist’s concepts of utility into 
an unrecognizable shape”). 
88. Id. at 119. 
89. See id. at 120 (“[People] assigned less utility to the beer from the grocery store.”). 
90. See id. at 119 (“[C]onsumers are sometimes guided by their perceptions of social 
appropriateness.”).  
91. See, e.g., id. at 465–468 (analogizing a non-rational game theory strategy to purchasing a 
lottery ticket when the payoff is at its highest). 
92. See generally HOW TO REASON, supra note 54 (enumerating examples of “zero-sum games” 
and “mixed-motive games”). 
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parties.99  The reason for this nonstrategic behavior is difficult to learn by 
experiment, but perhaps it is that the deviant player wants to alleviate the 
boredom of selecting the same square over and over.  In other words, it 
may come from a desire to “shake things up.”  In the same way, one can 
conjecture that many crimes may be responses to something other than 
rational choice.  As horrifying as the thought is, the failure of the rational 
choice model may be the basis of many of the most serious crimes—from 
murder based upon anger, to terrifying thrill killings.   
Furthermore, individuals have different perceptions of the certainty of 
punishment, as well as the unpleasantness of the same sentences.100  For 
example, people who have committed crimes and gotten away with them, 
understandably, tend to have lower expectations of the certainty of 
punishment.101  Furthermore, some people do not fear incarceration as 
much as others do.102  Ironically, the remembered deterrent of a lengthy 
sentence may decrease over time as the offender adapts, meaning that a 
longer sentence may deter less by the time it ends than a shorter one.103  
Sentences, however, are fashioned by judges who cannot know perceptual 
differences of these kinds among different people.104 
In summary, there are defects in a theory of rational choice that assumes 
accurate perception.  The economic model fails in many situations because 
perception is erroneous or a motive for rational choice is absent.  Indeed, 
some commentators claim that, in general, the economic model is 
inaccurate.105  These commentators have advanced the theory that 
 
99. See id. at 511 (“[M]aybe even reckless change is preferable to profitable boredom.”). 
100. See Perceptual Research on General Deterrence, supra note 64, at 550–57 (recognizing variance 
among individuals in their perception of risk, but noting studies have “blurred the distinction 
between perceptions of certainty and severity and have implicitly assumed that evaluations of severity 
are constant across respondents”). 
101. See id. at 551 (“[I]ndividuals who were actively involved in crime in the past have lower 
perceptions of certainty and severity in the present precisely because they have escaped being caught 
and punished for their crimes.”); Raymond Paternoster, supra note 49, at 809 (discussing the 
deterrence of criminal law through sanctions); Role of Deterrence, supra note 11, at 977–78 (recognizing 
the traditional assumption that criminal law will influence conduct). 
102. See Role of Deterrence, supra note 11, at 955 (“For those who have not yet experienced 
prison, it is the imagined horribleness of a prison sentence that keeps them from committing 
crimes.”). 
103. See id. (reiterating the notion that “punishment, once experienced, reduces the likelihood 
of the person who experienced the punishment [from] risking a similar punishment by offending 
again in the future”). 
104. See id. at 997 (commenting on the role of judicial discretion and its potential to produce 
perceived injustice). 
105. See infra Part III. 
15
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sentences based on individual criminal laws do not deter, and instead, it is 
the criminal justice system as a whole that deters.106  This model, which 
might be called “systemic” deterrence, is discussed in a later section of this 
article.107 
     2.    The Apparent Primacy of Certainty: Does Severity Even Count? 
There is broad consensus among researchers that increasing certainty of 
punishment is usually more effective than making punishment more 
severe.108  In other words, if the person contemplating a crime is 
reasonably certain that his act will be detected and punished, a longer term 
of years will not meaningfully enhance the deterrent.109  Survey research 
shows a version of the law of diminishing returns at work, by which the 
targeted potential criminal does not see a twenty-year sentence as 
proportionally more severe than one of ten years.110  In addition, it 
appears that non-detection or non-punishment in response to criminal acts 
revises a perpetrator’s estimate of the possible deterrent downward, or in 
other words, getting away with crime creates an expectation that 
punishment is unlikely.111  
At the same time, it is easier for legislative responses to crime waves to 
reflect a choice for greater severity.112  Increasing a sentence range is a 
readily available answer, even if theorists conclude that it will not be very 
effective.113  Increasing the certainty of detection, apprehension, 
conviction, and sentence, on the other hand, requires intervention into the 
criminal justice system, together with the possible need for expenditure of 
 
106. See infra Part III. 
107. See infra Part III.  
108. See generally Accepting the Null Hypothesis, supra note 34 (presenting evidence to support the 
conclusion that “variation in the severity of sanctions is unrelated to levels of crime”). 
109. Id. at 146. 
110. See Perceptual Research on General Deterrence, supra note 64, at 545 (“[I]ndividuals are deterred 
from committing criminal acts only if they perceive legal sanctions as certain.”). 
111. See id. at 551 (acknowledging the “experiential effect” and the problem it presents with 
regard to general deterrence); Raymond Paternoster, supra note 49, at 809 (“Prior perceptions of the 
risk of punishment are generally modified downward when people commit crimes and get away with 
it . . . .”); Role of Deterrence, supra note 11, at 977–78 (acknowledging the difficulties of deterrence and 
complexities that may arise as a result). 
112. See Role of Deterrence, supra note 11, at 994–97 (noting the need for improvement of the 
credibility of punishments). 
113. See id. at 967–69 (affirming a “deterrence rationale is common in the formulation of a 
wide range of sentencing rules and policies”). 
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substantial funds.114  In addition, methods for increasing certainty may be 
difficult to predict or understand.115 
Again, the picture is not so clear.  As for certainty, it may not be true 
that legislative improvement is impractical.116  There may be ways to 
provide a greater likelihood of punishment through changes in individual 
laws.117  One can consider the case of receiving stolen property.  
Suppression of this crime is particularly important because receivers 
generate theft crimes.118  At least one state has revised its laws by 
removing serious impediments to convictions by abolishing a requirement 
of corroboration of the receiver’s knowledge that the goods are stolen119 
and liberally admitting evidence of other crimes.120  At the same time, the 
state increased the likelihood of detection and apprehension of receivers 
by requiring pawnshops and other secondhand stores, which are natural 
markets for stolen goods, to keep records that facilitate the identification 
of sellers of these goods.121  These laws are likely to be known to 
pawnshop operators because they require them to engage in specific 
conduct,122 and pawnshops receive significant police attention.123  
Apparently, no study has compared the incidence of receiving stolen 
property before and after these enactments, but it seems obvious that they 
would increase the certainty of punishment, as well as the increase in 
knowledge among the target audience.  This approach may hold some 
 
114. See id. at 993 (“[S]uch increases would require one or all of the following: a significant 
increase in the amount we spend on law enforcement and criminal justice; an increase in the 
intrusiveness we suffer from law enforcement; and a reduction in the procedural safeguards we 
provide in criminal adjudications.”). 
115. See id. at 992–93 (“Sentencing discretion contributes to the uncertainty of 
punishment . . . .”). 
116. Id. at 993. 
117. Raymond Paternoster, supra note 49, at 766. 
118. See, e.g., Role of Deterrence, supra note 11, at 979 (illustrating the proposition that an increase 
in punishment could result in increased substitution crimes that cause more serious harm). 
119. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(c)(2) (West Supp. 2017). 
120. Id. § 31.03(c)(1). 
121. Id. § 31.03(c)(3). 
122. See id. (creating a presumption of criminal action unless the pawnshop owner takes 
certain actions, including obtaining a signed warranty that the seller has the right to possess the 
property). 
123. See Thomas J. Miles, Univ. of Chi. Sch. of L., Address at the Univ. of Mich. Law Sch.: 
The Law and Economics Workshop (Jan. 24, 2008) (available at https://www.law.umich.edu/ 
centersandprograms/lawandeconomics/workshops/Documents/Winter2008/miles.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/JPY5-C7U2]) (“Popular culture has long perceived the pawnshops as an outlet for stolen 
goods. . . .  [S]ome modern-day law enforcement officers share this perception.”). 
17
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promise for enhancing deterrence, but it can be used only in limited cases 
because changes in the laws to increase detection and conviction will, in 
many instances, increase the likelihood of erroneous conviction.124 
At the same time, the conclusion that severity does not matter may be 
overstated.  It seems probable that the primacy of certainty, and the 
relative irrelevance of severity, depend upon the likelihood of sentences 
with at least a minimum degree of severity.125  To take an extreme case, if 
a serious crime were greeted by a ticket instead of an arrest, and by a short 
period of shelf probation rather than any deprivation of liberty, even 
widespread detection of the crime would return a lesser quantum of 
deterrence than serious punishment would.126  As an example, one city 
has adopted a policy toward possession of small amounts of marijuana that 
involves ticketing, requirements of attendance at classes urging abstinence, 
and informal probation.127  Because the crime is not itself the most 
serious in the penal code, perhaps the severity of this “punishment”—four 
hours in a classroom—is sufficient to provide a degree of deterrence, 
although it seems likely to result in more instances of marijuana 
possession.128 
Perhaps another example is illegal entry into the United States by an 
alien who has been previously deported.  This situation is difficult because 
deterrence is limited by other factors important to criminal justice, such as 
proportionality, impact on others close to the actor, and the impossibility 
of dealing with too-large numbers of people.  But solely considered as 
deterrence, a second deportation, without any deprivation of liberty, may 
be insufficient to deter more illegal entries.129  Federal law creates a series 
 
124. See, e.g., Role of Deterrence, supra note 11, at 993 (recognizing a higher conviction rate may 
be obtained “by lowering the standard of proof from the demanding ‘beyond a reasonable doubt[,]’” 
but expressing concern of “criminal convictions retain[ing] even their current level of credibility”). 
125. See Perceptual Research on General Deterrence, supra note 64, at 550 (discussing a person’s 
response to severe sanctions when measured through their own perception of the impact of such a 
penalty on their lives). 
126. No study of this issue has apparently been conducted. 
127. See St. John Barned-Smith, Pot Smokers Rejoice: Small Amounts of Marijuana Now Can Lead to 
Class, Not Jail, CHRON (Mar. 1, 2017), www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Pot-smokers-
rejoice-small-amounts-of-marijuana-10967357.php [https://perma.cc/9UVL-4J4Q] (noting the 
implementation of a new policy in Harris County dealing with marijuana law). 
128. See id. (highlighting the changes in punishment from jail time). 
129. See, e.g., United States v. Corchado, No. CR 15-0393-JB, 2015 WL 10383207, at *23 
(D.N.M. Aug. 31, 2015) (holding Corchado-Aguirre’s “15-month sentence did not adequately deter 
him from committing additional immigration offenses”). 
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of increasing mandatory minimums for re-entry.130  This example features 
cases in which greater severity of the sanction might provide greater 
deterrence if enforcement were widespread—although that may be 
impractical because of both logistical and humanitarian concerns.131 
These may not be the only types of situations in which severity may be 
important.  If an increased sanction is well publicized within a group of 
people particularly interested in it, some studies show a measurable 
increase in deterrence.132  For example, in one study, a so-called three-
strikes law, which severely enhanced sentences upon conviction for three 
qualifying felonies, was followed by a statistically significant decrease in 
defendants eligible for the more severe sentence.133  One can infer that 
this effect was the product of deterrence since it focused on defendants 
not yet incarcerated.134  Likewise, a law increasing sentences for the use of 
guns during robberies was followed by a lessened incidence of gun 
robberies, and regression analysis showed a statistically significant 
deterrent effect.135  In general, however, when there is a decrease in crime 
rates, confounding variables such as incapacitation may have produced the 
results,136 and other studies suggest that no deterrence results from 
lengthy sentences.137 
 
130. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1996) (mandating incarceration of an alien who enters or attempts to 
enter the United States before their imprisonment term is complete, “for the remainder of the 
sentence” and who, further, “shall be subject to such other penalties relating to the reentry of 
deported aliens as may be available under this section or any other provision of law”). 
131. Cf. Role of Deterrence, supra note 11, at 994 (noting the decreased delay in punishment “by 
giving law enforcement greater authority to intrude into personal affairs to find offenders more 
quickly” could lead to violations of constitutional rights).  Granting law enforcement this authority 
could require a change in procedures or an increase in resources “that could be held 
unconstitutional” or “require unpopular trade-offs.”  Id. 
132. Cf. id. at 989 (discussing the likelihood of decreased crime if the law is more widely 
known, understood, and even taught to the unbeknownst offenders who may not have the education 
or experience to understand the law on their own). 
133. Daniel Kessler & Steven D. Levitt, Using Sentence Enhancements to Distinguish Between 
Deterrence and Incapacitation, 42 J.L. & ECON. 343, 357–58 (1999) [hereinafter Using Sentence 
Enhancements]. 
134. See id. at 343–45 (“[B]y looking at changes in crime immediately following the 
introduction of a sentence enhancement, it is possible to isolate a pure deterrent effect that is not 
contaminated by incapacitation.”). 
135. David S. Abrams, Estimating the Deterrent Effect of Incarceration Using Sentencing Enhancements, 
4 AMER. ECON. J. APPLIED ECON. 32, 42–46 (2012). 
136. See Using Sentence Enhancements, supra note 133, at 343–44 (asserting incapacitation is a 
primary force in crime patterns). 
137. See Accepting the Null Hypothesis, supra note 34, at 187 (concluding that severity generally 
does not influence deterrence at all). 
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The conclusion remains, therefore, that certainty of punishment is more 
important than severity, and probably, more important by far.  At the same 
time, this statement has to be qualified by the observation that it depends 
upon a sentence severe enough to create at least a perception of 
sufficiently serious unpleasantness.138  Furthermore, enhanced severity 
can provide greater deterrence if it is well targeted.139 
C.    Indirect and Extralegal Effects 
In addition to the effect of criminal sentences, the criminal justice 
system can cause deterrence from indirect and extralegal reactions.140  For 
example, a spouse who has disapproved of the actor’s course of crimes 
may view a particularly egregious example as the last straw and leave the 
marriage.141  A prisoner may find herself saying, “I received a shorter 
sentence than I had feared, but it was long enough to make me lose my 
job; now, with my criminal record, I’m having difficulties finding any work 
at all.”142  These kinds of extrinsic effects might be serious enough in 
some cases to decrease “the expected utility of crime.”143 
Could the government use the existence of these kinds of deterrents to 
reduce crime?  Possibly so.  Bankrate.com estimates the total expense of 
an arrest for driving under the influence can climb to $20,000.144  
 
138. Role of Deterrence, supra note 11, at 978. 
139. See Perceptual Research on General Deterrence, supra note 64, at 555–56 (“[I]f perceptions of 
sanctions influence an individual’s decision to refrain from a criminal act, this influence will operate 
in the immediate situation confronting the individual, not in some distant set of circumstances.”). 
140. See generally Harold G. Grasmick & Robert J. Bursik, Jr., Conscience, Significant Others, and 
Rational Choice: Extending the Deterrence Model, 24 L. & SOC’Y REV. 837, 838 (1990) (“Many sociologists, 
however, have concentrated on survey data . . . to compare and potentially to integrate deterrence 
theory with those theories which emphasize sources of compliance with the law other than the threat 
of legal sanctions.”). 
141. See id. at 840–41 (suggesting an actor’s significant other has some control over extralegal 
consequences). 
142. See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum, Out of Trouble, but Criminal Records Keep Men Out of Work, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/01/business/out-of-trouble-but-
criminal-records-keep-men-out-of-work.html?mcubz=1 [http://perma.cc/996R-M864] (“The share 
of American men with criminal records — particularly black men — grew rapidly in recent decades 
as the government pursued aggressive law enforcement strategies, especially against drug crimes.  In 
the aftermath of the Great Recession, those men are having particular trouble finding work.”). 
143. See Conscience, Significant Others, and Rational Choice, supra note 140, at 839–40 (noting 
various factors, such as shame and embarrassment, can have an effect on expected utility). 
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Advertisements telling potentially intoxicated drivers “[y]ou can’t afford it” 
are examples of the use of extralegal deterrence.145  In fact, these kinds of 
indirect deterrents include billboards informing the public that an arrest 
for driving under the influence can cost as much as seventeen-thousand 
dollars.146 
The phenomenon of extralegal deterrence shows how multifaceted 
deterrence is.  And there is much more.  For example, what of the 
potential criminal who desists from an act because his or her conscience is 
affected by societal condemnation of the crime?  Is this effect to be called 
deterrence, or is it something else altogether?  These questions raise issues 
about criminal justice objectives that are related to deterrence and are 
arguably a part of it. 
II.    EFFECTS THAT ARE RELATED TO DETERRENCE 
BUT DISTINGUISHABLE 
A.    Condemnation and Internalization 
The term condemnation refers to a phenomenon similar to retributive 
justice, but with a more utilitarian edge.147  Condemnation is the effect of 
criminal sentences upon ordinary citizens who do not commit crimes.148  
It results from a shared sense that the law is being enforced, and it 
strengthens motives against criminal activity.149  In a way, condemnation 
is the glue that holds society together.  As the great sociologist Emile 
Durkheim put it, criminal sentences have an effect not just on those who 
commit crimes, but also, and perhaps more importantly, on “upright 
people”: 
 
145. See, e.g., TxDOT Urges Texans to Avoid a DWI This Summer, BUSINESSWIRE (Aug. 16, 2010, 
11:00 AM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20100816005510/en/TxDOT-Urges-
Texans-Avoid-DWI-Summer [http://perma.cc/977B-5TV9] [hereinafter TxDOT Urges Texans] 
(describing how TxDOT uses billboards and radio advertisements to warn drivers of the 
consequences of a DWI conviction). 
146. W. Gardner Selby, TxDOT Billboard Says a DWI Costs You $17,000, POLITIFACT (Apr. 15, 
2011, 10:36 AM), http://www.politifact.com/texas/statements/2011/apr/15/texas-department-
transportation/txdot-billboard-says-dwi-costs-you-17000/ [http://perma.cc/29NK-RFCX]. 
147. See DAVID CRUMP, supra note 14, at 571–72 (reasoning the word condemnation serves a 
more functional purpose). 
148. Id. 
149. See id. at 572 (asserting the concept of condemnation acts to reinforce society’s faith in 
the legal system). 
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Although [punishment] proceeds . . . from movements which are 
passionate[,] . . . it does play a useful role. . . .  [T]his role is not where we 
ordinarily look for it.  It does not serve, or else only serves quite secondarily, 
in correcting the culpable or in intimidating possible followers [through 
deterrence]. . . .  [Instead,] [i]ts true function is to maintain social cohesion 
intact, while maintaining all its vitality in the common conscience. . . .  It is 
necessary, then, that [the common conscience] be affirmed forcibly[,] . . . by 
an authentic act which can consist only in suffering inflicted upon the 
agent. . . .  [T]his suffering is not a gratuitous cruelty. . . .  Without this 
necessary satisfaction, what we call the moral conscience could not be 
conserved.  We can thus say without paradox that punishment is above all 
designed to act upon upright people . . . since it serves to heal the wounds 
made upon collective sentiments[.]150  
In other words, the reason most people do not commit serious crimes is 
simply that they have absorbed the common conscience, and therefore 
they are “upright people.”151  An “upright person” does not need 
deterrence after reading the newspaper and seeing that a severe sentence 
has been imposed for a heinous crime, because the news reinforces the 
commitment not to engage in crime.152  This function of criminal law is 
brought about by the force of condemnation.153 
Condemnation can be internalized by the potential criminal, so as to 
cause desistance from crime.154  Williams and Hawkins explain this 
mechanism against crime as follows, in the context of prevention of 
murder by punishment—not through deterrence, but as a consequence of 
condemnation felt by the actor himself: 
Imagine an increase in the number of offenders . . . who are [actually 
punished] within a given American state.  Suppose further that this increase 
is associated with a subsequent reduction in the rate of [the particular crime].  
 
150. ÉMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (George Simpson trans., 
1933) (2d ed. 2013). 
151. DAVID CRUMP, supra note 14, at 572. 
152. See generally Kenneth Dowler, Media Consumption and Public Attitudes Toward Crime and 
Justice: The Relationship Between Fear of Crime, Punitive Attitudes, and Perceived Police Effectiveness, 10 J. CRIM. 
JUST. & POPULAR CULTURE 109, 109 (2003) (“The public’s perception of victims, criminals, deviants, 
and law enforcement officials is largely determined by their portrayal in the mass media.”). 
153. See generally Perceptual Research on General Deterrence, supra note 64 (discussing the effects of 
condemnation). 
154. Id. at 547 (proposing one’s own self-condemnation acts “as a moral inhibitor to 
[criminal] involvement”). 
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One reason for the reduction, of course, could be general deterrence.  
Potential offenders perceive the increased risk of [punishment], and this 
perception frightens them from committing [the crime].  This sequence is 
consistent with the conception of general deterrence . . . . 
[But a] competing interpretation of the reduction in [crime] is that the 
increased threat of [punishment] intensifies the personal and/or social 
condemnation of the crime, with condemnation operating as a moral 
inhibitor to the [potential criminal’s] use of lethal violence.  This explanation 
is consistent with a longstanding argument in the sociology of law . . .  that 
legal punishment can reinforce the condemnation of wrongful acts.  In other 
words, the commitment to the belief that an act . . . is wrong can be 
strengthened by the knowledge that offenders are punished.155 
The result, then, is that criminal punishment works its effects upon upright 
people, as Durkheim said.156  But through what is commonly called 
conscience, condemnation extends beyond upright people.157  
Condemnation also communicates to those who otherwise might be 
tempted to commit crimes, and through this mediating force, it persuades 
potential criminals to avoid their crimes because the actor feels, internally, 
the condemnation of the act by society.158  That is to say, actors are 
deterred from committing crimes simply by their consciences.  Whether to 
call this deterrence or something else is a metaphysical issue. 
B.    Stigma, Attachment Costs, and Commitment Costs 
In addition to this effect within the actor through conscience, there are 
other deterrents that might be called stigma, attachment costs, and 
commitment costs.159  These effects might be seen as extralegal 
deterrents, although they are slightly different.160  They are reactions to 
the actual or moral force of the criminal justice system, but they are 
expressed by agents outside the system itself.161 
 
155. Id. at 559–60. 
156. ÉMILE DURKHEIM, supra note 150. 
157. See Perceptual Research on General Deterrence, supra note 64, at 547 (“An example of indirect 
‘crime prevention,’ not general deterrence, is refraining from a criminal act because the perceived 
threat of punishment intensifies one’s condemnation of the act . . . .”). 
158. Id. 
159. Id. at 562, 564–65 (1986). 
160. See id. at 561–65 (discussing the subtle, but real, distinctions between legal and extralegal 
sanctions). 
161. Id. at 561. 
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What is meant by stigma?  Imagine an individual who has just been 
charged with possession of cocaine.  The actor’s use and occasional sales 
of the prohibited substance may have been tolerated by the actor’s peer 
group up to now, and may not have been known to others, such as 
business associates or employers.  But the arrest and the proceedings that 
follow will create a stigma that did not exist before the indictment, and 
communicate the seriousness of the matter to those who know of it.162  
Alternatively, it may be that the behavior itself (i.e., drug use) creates a 
stigma: “He’s a cokehead.”163  This effect, which is related to the 
condemnation created by the criminal justice system, provides a separate 
motive for avoiding the crime.164 
Is this stigma a form of deterrence, or is it something else?  Williams 
and Hawkins call it deterrence if the effect is created by the operation of 
the criminal justice system.165  Additionally, “[i]f persons anticipate that 
others will disapprove of their arrest for committing a certain act, and they 
refrain from that activity because they fear the stigma of being caught, this 
should count as an instance of general deterrence with a legal sanction 
being the source.”166  On the other hand, these commentators say, the 
effect is to be differently characterized if the actor responds not to the fear 
of arrest, because the risk is perceived as low, but instead desists because 
of the potential disapproval by others of the act itself: “In this case, fear of 
stigma stems from the act, not the sanction, and thus operates as an 
extralegal sanction.”167  In other words, it is a product of condemnation.  
Again, deterrence and condemnation are intertwined. 
In any event, these considerations suggest that law enforcement, by 
means of detection and apprehension, can suppress some kinds of crimes 
even without a sanction under the law.  The treatment of marijuana cases 
discussed in a previous section of this article may provide an example.168  
It is possible that peers do not react negatively to the actor’s behavior in 
 
162. Id. at 562–63. 
163. See id. at 563 (“[I]f the risk of arrest is seen as low and the severity of possible 
punishments is considered minimal, individuals might still be prevented from committing a crime 
because they anticipate stigmatizing reactions from others for involvement in crime itself.”). 
164. Id. 
165. Id. at 547. 
166. Id. at 562–63. 
167. Id. at 563. 
168. See supra Part IB2. 
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using marijuana.169  Nevertheless, there is evidence that the same people 
who tolerate the behavior may react to the stigma of an encounter with the 
criminal justice system, such as an arrest, particularly if it is repeated.170  It 
appears that charges for offenses, such as driving while intoxicated and 
writing bad checks, produce this effect.171  The relatively light treatment 
of marijuana possession, likewise, may be sufficient to reinforce its 
illegality even without an arrest, if the jurisdiction has chosen to treat it as 
illegal.172  
Thus, it may be that lowering actual punishments for lesser offenses 
may not impair the deterrent effect flowing from a brief encounter with 
the criminal justice system.173  This is why a jurisdiction that retains the 
principle—that marijuana possession is illegal—can nevertheless achieve 
deterrence by abolishing formal punishment and relying on four-hour 
abstinence classes instead.  The stigma of being ticketed for the offense 
may itself provide a modicum of deterrence, perhaps even the desired 
amount. 
Attachment costs are the damage done to close relationships by 
engagement in or accusations of crime, as contrasted to reputational injury 
by stigma.174  If you minimize your incidents of driving while intoxicated 
because your spouse disapproves and threatens to leave, you are 
responding to a kind of condemnation.175  If you curtail the activity for 
fear that you may be arrested, and that this will cause your spouse to leave, 
the effect is deterrence by the legal system.176  The distinction between 
these two phenomena, of course, is hardly the point.  A mixture of 
condemnation and deterrence probably operates in these (and many other) 
circumstances. 
 
169. See Perceptual Research on General Deterrence, supra note 64, at 562 (suggesting college 
students may only react negatively when an individual is arrested for using marijuana). 
170. See id. at 563 (acknowledging the existence of a stigma associated with being arrested for 
crimes such as drug usage, i.e., marijuana). 
171. Id. 
172. St. John Barned-Smith, supra note 127. 
173. See, e.g., id. (discussing Harris County’s newer, lighter sentencing for marijuana, but 
acknowledging the county’s imposition of jail time when necessary). 
174. Perceptual Research on General Deterrence, supra note 64, at 564. 
175. See Conscience, Significant Others, and Rational Choice, supra note 140, at 841 (characterizing an 
actor’s significant other, including “friends, family, employer, etc., [anyone] whose opinions about an 
actor are considered important by that actor,” as an individual or individuals with some control). 
176. See Perceptual Research on General Deterrence, supra note 64, at 563 (emphasizing the deterrent 
effect of a threat of stigmatizing reactions even when criminal penalties are low). 
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Research shows it is not the strength of the attachment that counts.177  
Instead, a concern about disruption in one’s personal relationships, 
whether close or not, is apparently the driving force.178  If you foresee 
that your relationship with your brother will deteriorate if you are arrested, 
the deterrent exists, even if you are not particularly close to your 
brother.179  Once again, as in the case of severity, people contemplating 
crime are not closely calibrated in their reactions to disincentives.180 
Commitment costs are the disadvantages to one’s other activities caused 
by engagement in crime.181  A person who desists from crime because of 
fears that arrest or conviction might create barriers to future education or 
jobs is reacting to the threat of commitment costs.182  Likewise, the 
financial cost of being charged with driving while intoxicated can be a 
powerful disincentive, as is discussed in a previous section of this 
article.183 
These considerations might give rise to a serious use of deterrence (and 
condemnation) that does not flow from actual arrest or criminal 
charges.184  Some jurisdictions provide advertisements designed to 
prevent people from drinking and driving.185  Could these advertisements 
combine warnings about stigma, attachment costs, and commitment costs, 
all together, and obtain more “bang for their buck?”  The voice-over or 
text might say, “The stigma to your reputation from getting arrested for 
driving while intoxicated is only the beginning.  You’ll destroy the 
attachment you have with friends and family.  And commitment costs can 
run as high as fifteen thousand dollars, as well as killing your job and 
education prospects.”  This appeal may even exceed the already-
understood deterrent from conviction and sentencing for the crime. 
 
177. Id. at 564. 
178. Id. 
179. See, e.g., id. (highlighting the effect of potential stigma of committing crimes on 
relationships of all strengths). 
180. See Role of Deterrence, supra note 11, at 956 (describing how penalties might not significantly 
influence an individual “if the chance of getting caught is seen as trivial”). 
181. Perceptual Research on General Deterrence, supra note 64, at 565. 
182. Id. 
183. Supra Part IIB. 
184. See Craig Guillot, supra note 144 (finding more jurisdictions are using examples of 
extralegal consequences as a motivational tool of deterrence). 
185. See TxDOT Urges Texans., supra note 145 (detailing use of indirect costs of a DWI 
conviction to discourage drunk driving). 
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C.    Incapacitation 
As the great criminologist, James Q. Wilson, explained, “When 
criminals are deprived of their liberty, as by imprisonment[,] . . . their 
ability to commit offenses against citizens is ended.  We say these persons 
have been ‘incapacitated,’ and we try to estimate the amount by which 
crime is reduced by this incapacitation.”186  This effect of incarceration 
has at least one advantage over deterrence, in that it does not depend on 
what the actor thinks or knows about sentences.187  It prevents future 
crimes regardless of what the incapacitated person perceives and without 
concern for whether the actor makes rational choices.188  As Wilson says, 
“By contrast, deterrence works only if people take into account the costs 
and benefits of alternative courses of action[.]”189  He adds, 
“Incapacitation, on the other hand, works by definition: its effects result 
from the physical restraint placed upon the offender and not from his 
subjective state.”190 
But incapacitation cannot be used routinely.191  The idea of confining 
people for lengthy prison terms, on account of episodic crimes that are not 
the most serious, would violate other principles of criminal justice, such as 
that sentencing should bear a rough proportionality to the gravity of their 
offenses.192  As Wilson says, “[T]he most rational way to use the 
incapacitative powers of our prisons would be to do so selectively.”193  
This regime of selective incapacitation presumably would depend upon 
estimates of the probability of recidivism multiplied by the magnitude of 
harm likely to be caused by the actor’s future crimes.194 
The trouble is, these determinants are difficult to estimate,195 and even 
if we could approximate them, the commentators would not agree on how 
 
186. James Q. Wilson, Selective Incapacitation, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING 148, 148 
(Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth eds., 1992). 
187. See id. (“[I]t does not require us to make any assumptions about human nature.”). 
188. See id. at 149 (“[I]ts effects result from the physical restraint placed upon the offender 
and not from his subjective state.”). 
189. Id. at 148. 
190. Id. at 149. 
191. See id. at 152 (proposing incapacitation via incarceration as the most effective method 
when handed out to those who commit serious crimes). 
192. See id. at 148 (“Incapacitation cannot be the sole purpose of the criminal justice system; if 
it were, we would put everybody who has committed one or two offenses in prison until they were 
too old to commit another.”). 
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to rank them.  Wilson, for example, says that longer sentences should not 
be used “for persons who have prior records, or for persons whose 
present crime is especially grave[.]”196  Since we cannot predict future 
lawlessness very well, however, perhaps it makes sense to use past 
behavior as an objective measure, in spite of Wilson’s pronouncement.  
Thus, a three-strikes law provides a long sentence for a property criminal 
(as well as others) who is convicted of a third qualifying offense.197  The 
reason, unlike the idea behind deterrence, is that this actor is 
overwhelmingly likely to have committed undetected crimes and is sure to 
commit others in the future if not prevented from doing so; therefore, 
incapacitation is justified.198  The sentence is probably something of a 
deterrent; it may be perceived by the legislature as consistent with 
retributive justice, and it is imposed in a situation in which rehabilitation 
has not been achieved during past sentences.  Thus, the incapacitative 
sentence created by a three-strikes law is also arguably consistent with 
other goals of the criminal justice system. 
There are other criticisms of incapacitation.199  Von Hirsch, for 
example, argues that we are likely to pick the wrong people for 
incapacitation.200  False positives result because there is nothing to alert us 
to noncommission of crimes by those who are incarcerated, while crimes 
by those who are not incarcerated make news: 
[A]ny system of preventive incarceration conceals erroneous confinements, while 
revealing erroneous releases.  The individual who is wrongly identified as 
dangerous is confined, and thus has little or no opportunity to demonstrate 
 
196. Id. 
197. See Role of Deterrence, supra note 11, at 964 (discussing how the three-strike laws targeting 
repeat offenders have positive effects on the community by locking up dangerous criminals); see also 
‘Three Strikes’ Sentencing Laws, FINDLAW, http://criminal.findlaw.com/criminal-procedure/three-
strikes-sentencing-laws.html [http://perma.cc/QZ8B-B9A5] [hereinafter Three Strikes’ Sentencing 
Laws] (“The sentencing enhancements in this law can have a significant impact on a criminal 
defendant.”). 
198. Role of Deterrence, supra note 11, at 964 (asserting the three-strike laws targeting repeat 
offenders are justified in part through the “incapacitation of dangerous offenders by predicting future 
dangerousness from repeated past offenses”); see also ‘Three Strikes’ Sentencing Laws, supra note 197 
(“The primary focus of these laws is the containment of recidivism (repeat offenses by a small 
number of criminals).”). 
199. See, e.g., Andrew von Hirsch, Prediction and False Positives, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING 
113, 120 (Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth eds., 1992) (“[A]ny system of preventative 
incarceration conceals erroneous confinements, while revealing erroneous releases.”). 
200. See id. at 114–15 (enumerating the failures of experts to verify their predictions of 
dangerousness when using the predictive model as one cause of false positives). 
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that he would not have committed [another] crime had he been released.  
The individual who is wrongly identified as nondangerous remains at large, 
so it comes to public attention if he later commits a crime.  Thus, once a 
preventive system is established, it creates the illusion of generating only one 
kind of evidence: evidence of erroneous release[] that prompts decision makers to 
expand the categories of persons who are preventively confined.201 
Von Hirsch takes the argument one step further; cost-benefit thinking of 
this kind is “wholly inappropriate,” he says, because if it generates 
mistaken confinements, then it is “unacceptable in absolute terms because 
it violates the obligation of society to do individual justice.”202  
This conclusion is questionable, because sentencing is the result of very 
rough approximations based upon debatable assumptions.  Von Hirsch’s 
argument would seem to prohibit consideration of deterrence too, because 
the effects of sentencing for deterrence can be perceived only dimly, and 
our efforts to sentence for rehabilitation or retributive justice suffer from 
the same kind of inaccuracy.203  The conclusion, then, would be that no 
purpose of sentencing is legitimate.  Furthermore, Von Hirsch’s one-way 
reasoning proves too much because the impetus for incapacitation is likely 
to be based upon statistics showing overall crime rates rather than by 
evaluation of individual cases, so that the use of preventive sentences 
responds to decreases in crime rates instead.204 
In fact, the most recent development in incapacitation is sentencing 
based on statistically developed algorithms that predict recidivism.205  In 
State v. Loomis,206 the defendant faced incarceration on several charges, 
including driving a stolen vehicle.207  A trial judge in Wisconsin sentenced 
 
201. Id. at 120–21. 
202. Id. at 122. 
203. See generally Using Sentence Enhancements, supra note 133 (noting the difficulties in measuring 
deterrence). 
204. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural Science 
Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 201 (2004) [hereinafter Does Criminal Law Deter?] 
(discussing two studies attempting to “distinguish the effects of deterrence and incapacitation,” both 
of which are based on aggregate crime statistics). 
205. See generally Jason Tashea, Calculating Crime, 103 A.B.A. J. 54, 56 (Mar. 2017) (discussing 
the use of COMPAS: an algorithm used to statistically estimate an offender’s “likelihood of 
committing a future crime”). 
206. State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017). 
207. Id. at 749.  This decision has produced a list of followers, most recently State v. Larson.  
See State v. Larson, No. 2016AP503–CRNM, 2017 WL 831248, slip op. at 2 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 
2017) (affirming the use of the COMPAS algorithm). 
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Loomis to seven years of incarceration,208 partly on the basis of a risk 
assessment score generated by a method called COMPAS (Correctional 
Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions).209  The risk 
assessment, in turn, reflected answers to 137 questions provided by the 
offender, in addition to his criminal record, about subjects ranging from 
parental divorce behavior to whether he had a telephone at home.210  
Loomis argued that COMPAS violated his right to due process because, 
among other grounds, the algorithm was a trade secret, and its proprietary 
nature prevented examination of its workings.211  
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, upheld the sentence.212  The 
Supreme Court of the United States, on petition for certiorari, has invited 
the views of the United States.213  The Wisconsin court’s decision is 
supported by the consideration that a judge’s unguided decision making 
for incapacitation or deterrence is equally inscrutable and, arguably, even 
more proprietary than COMPAS.214  The assistant attorney general who 
argued the case said that the algorithm allowed the state to “tailor limited 
resources in the best way possible[,]” and a spokesman for COMPAS 
claimed that it “facilitate[d] the implementation of evidence-based 
practices[.]”215  But a group studying a similar risk assessment in Broward 
County, Florida, charged that it was too inaccurate—only “somewhat 
more accurate than a coin flip;” a characterization that COMPAS’s owners 
disputed—and that it found high risk almost twice as often for black 
defendants as for white defendants.216  Again, however, the arguments 
tumble against each other so as to inhibit conclusions.  Supporters of 
COMPAS pointed out that if, in fact, black individuals also are 
 
208. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 749 (rendering a mixed sentence consisting of “four years of initial 
confinement and three years of extended supervision”). 
209. Id. at 753–54. 
210. Jason Tashea, supra note 205, at 56. 
211. Id. at 54, 56. 
212. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 754. 
213. See Loomis v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1240 (2017) (Mem.) (“The Acting Solicitor General 
is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.”). 
214. Jason Tashea, supra note 205, at 58.  Supporters argue that if COMPAS is a “black box,” 
so is “a judge’s head.”  Id. 
215. Id. at 56–57. 
216. Id. at 57. 
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disproportionately represented in other crime statistics, an algorithm 
cannot be faulted for reflecting this reality.217 
Another algorithmic tool called the Public Safety Assessment has been 
used in thirty jurisdictions and “may avoid many of the critiques[.]”218  
Meanwhile, one ongoing issue is whether the algorithms use or 
discriminate on the basis of gender.219  Additionally, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court has said, “[I]f the inclusion of gender promotes accuracy, it 
serves the interests of institutions and defendants, rather than a 
discriminatory purpose.”220  But, in Craig v. Boren,221 the Supreme Court 
of the United States appears to have prohibited the use of gender in 
criminal laws, even if accurately based on statistics, although that decision 
did not involve sentencing.222  COMPAS, the Wisconsin court explained, 
used gender for “statistical norming,” or in other words, for assigning 
different computations to men and women.223  This approach, however, 
would assign higher dangerousness scores to men than women.224  The 
unresolved issues have been described as “the Wild West” and “a 
mess,”225 which the Supreme Court has yet to clarify.226 
So, should the courts sentence for the purpose of incapacitation?  Or 
should they sentence for deterrence, or for something else?  Some indicia 
of risks of dangerousness do seem to justify incapacitation, such as those 
 
217. See id. at 59 (“‘[E]ven if an algorithm is equally accurate for all, more [African-Americans] 
and males will be classified as high-risk’ because African-Americans and men are more likely to be 
arrested for a violent crime.”). 
218. Id. at 58. 
219. Id. at 57. 
220. State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 766 (Wis. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017) 
(Mem.). 
221. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
222. Id. at 208–10 (“[T]he principles embodied in the Equal Protection Clause are not to be 
rendered inapplicable by statistically measured but loose-fitting generalities concerning the drinking 
tendencies of aggregate groups . . . .  We conclude that the gender-based differential contained in [the 
statute at issue] constitutes a denial of the equal protection of the laws to males aged 18–20 and 
reverse the judgment of the District Court.”). 
223. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 765–66. 
224. Jason Tashea, supra note 205, at 57. 
225. Id. at 59. 
226. See id. (“Loomis’ attorney filed a petition with the U.S. Supreme Court to overturn the 
state court’s decision, arguing that the use of Compas violated his 14th Amendment rights to due 
process.”).  The Supreme Court denied the writ of certiorari.  Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749. 
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involving repeated crime.227  Incapacitation of a serial murderer, for 
example, responds to a combination of the severity of the offense and its 
repetition, and even if the combination does not unerringly signal future 
criminality, the risk may justify a sentence of life imprisonment or 
more.228  Perhaps experience with algorithms like COMPAS will prove 
that they furnish sound grounds for incapacitation, although it seems 
probable that the counterarguments will always be with us.229  At the 
least, algorithms combine an evidentiary basis for incapacitation with a 
kind of uniformity in sentencing based on similarly generated risk 
assessments.230  Deterrence, on the other hand, seems a likely basis for 
sentencing when conviction is relatively certain (at least for an actor who 
repeats the crime) and when the targeted offenders have reason to know 
about the deterrent sentence.231  One might conclude that three-strikes 
laws, to the extent they are not already justified as incapacitative, fit this 
rationale for deterrence.232 
One of the problems with conclusions in this area, however, is that it 
can be difficult to separate the effect of incapacitation from that of 
deterrence.233  If armed robbers, for example, receive moderate sentences 
of incarceration—say, three to five years upon first conviction—one can 
probably foresee that there will be an incapacitative effect, because at any 
time, a portion of the offenders in this category will be prevented from 
committing their crimes, even if the preventive effect does not extend to 
all.234  And presumably, there is a deterrent effect too, even if it is 
 
227. See Role of Deterrence, supra note 11, at 964 (asserting three-strike laws targeting repeat 
offenders are justified in part by the “incapacitation of dangerous offenders by predicting future 
dangerousness from repeated past offenses”). 
228. Talitha Ebrite, Toward a Balanced Equation: Advocating Consistency in the Sentencing of Serial 
Killers, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 685, 720 (2006). 
229. See Jason Tashea, supra note 205, at 56 (rejecting the use of algorithmic risk assessments 
because “[t]hey may exacerbate unwarranted and unjust disparities that are already far too common 
in our criminal justice system and in our society”). 
230. See id. (explaining COMPAS uses several factors, including a person’s criminal history 
and answers to specific questions, to determine their risk of committing a crime in the future). 
231. See Role of Deterrence, supra note 11, at 964 (discussing three-strikes laws and their deterrent 
effect on repeat offenders). 
232. Id. 
233. See Does Criminal Law Deter?, supra note 204, at 200–01 (suggesting some studies mislabel 
“incapacitative effects” as “deterrent effects”). 
234. See id. at 201(“[I]t is possible that the alteration of crime rate that follows [an increase in 
prison terms] is a result of locking away for a longer period those repeat criminals who are 
responsible for a good deal of the crimes committed.”). 
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muted.235  In this situation, if the crime rate decreases, we cannot easily 
learn whether it is incapacitation that is operating, or deterrence.236  In 
most cases, the effect is probably caused by both operating together.237 
III.    SYSTEMIC DETERRENCE: AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE 
ECONOMIC MODEL 
A.    What Is Systemic Deterrence, and How Does It Work? 
The theory of deterrence that comes first to mind is likely the market or 
economic model.  In Gregg v. Georgia,238 the case that upheld modern 
death penalty statutes, the Supreme Court apparently accepted this market 
model: 
[F]or many [murderers], the death penalty undoubtedly is a significant 
deterrent.  There are carefully contemplated murders, such as murder for 
hire, where the possible penalty of death may well enter into the cold 
calculus that precedes the decision to act.  And there are some categories of 
murder, such as murder by a life prisoner, where other sanctions may not be 
adequate.239 
The Court’s “cold calculus” reasoning suggests that it is referring to an 
expected enhanced sentence that produces behavior based on the 
economic model.240  By this theory, the perpetrator is like a consumer in 
the marketplace who weighs the particular reward against the specific 
cost.241  Maybe this situation involves the combination of awareness of 
the actual sentencing law and rational choice that can sometimes drive the 
economic model. 
 
235. See, e.g., Role of Deterrence, supra note 11, at 951 (arguing that the general existence of the 
criminal justice system is itself a deterrent, but that specifically tailored criminal statutes have a 
limited deterrent effect). 
236. See Using Sentence Enhancements, supra note 133, at 344 (“[M]ost empirical tests of 
deterrence are, in practice, joint tests of deterrence and incapacitation.”). 
237. See id. (contending reduced crime rates resulting from increased arrest rates are 
“consistent with the presence of deterrent effects, incapacitation, or both”). 
238. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
239. Id. at 185–86. 
240. See id. (describing the thought process of criminals before certain crimes, such as murder 
for hire, which often involves an assessment of the potential punishment he or she will face if 
caught). 
241. See supra Part IA. 
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But in general, this is probably not the way that deterrence works.  
Instead, the more likely mechanism is that an offender is affected by what 
can be called “systemic” deterrence.242  The research suggests that 
deterrence from manipulation of precise sentence ranges accompanying 
identifiable criminal offenses is marginal at best for most offenses.243  
But, the consensus is that deterrence does result from the criminal justice 
system.244  The conclusion might be stated as: sentences for particular 
crimes do not deter, but the criminal justice system as a whole deters.245 
Sometimes courts have taken surprisingly narrow views of systemic 
deterrence.246  For example, in United States v. Edwards,247 the court 
affirmed a sentence of probation and restitution for what it described as a 
“serious” white collar offense,248 where the defendant had been 
previously convicted of a similar crime, and was described by another 
judge in another case as a “big time thief.”249  The district court 
considered a sentencing law that required adequate deterrence and 
concluded that only people residing in the defendant’s “community” were 
likely to know of his sentence.250  A dissenting judge criticized the 
majority’s “unnecessarily restrictive view of general deterrence.”251  In 
fact, both the majority and dissent confined their analysis to the 
 
242. See Role of Deterrence, supra note 11, at 951 (acknowledging the general deterrent effect of a 
criminal justice system, but finding the manipulation of criminal law “according to a deterrence-
optimizing analysis, may have a limited effect or even no effect beyond what the system’s broad 
deterrent warning has already achieved”). 
243. See id. at 1001 (expressing the view that doctrinal manipulations of criminal law are likely 
to achieve their intended deterrent effect only in the exceptional case where several conditions are 
met simultaneously). 
244. See id. (“[H]aving a criminal justice system that imposes punishment can and does deter 
violations.”); see also Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-First Century, 
23 CRIME & JUST. 1, 3 (1998) (arguing the criminal justice system successfully “exert[s] a very 
substantial deterrent effect”).  
245. See Role of Deterrence, supra note 11, at 951 (“Having a punishment system does deter.  But 
there is growing evidence to suggest skepticism about the criminal law’s deterrent effect—that is, 
skepticism about the ability to deter crime through the manipulation of criminal law rules and 
penalties.”). 
246. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 595 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2010) (examining the 
lowers court’s decision that Edward’s sentence would only deter those in his immediate community 
and finding this to be an “unnecessarily restrictive view of general deterrence”). 
247. United States v. Edwards, 595 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2010). 
248. Id. at 1015. 
249. Id. at 1018 (Bea, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
250. Id. at 1024 (Bea, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
251. Id. at 1021–22 (Bea, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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particularized economic model, and neither considered systemic 
deterrence.252 
Justice Brennan has described systemic deterrence by saying that the 
issue is not “whether there is some specific deterrent consequence.”253  
Separately, he added, “Deterrence can operate in several ways. . . .  ‘It is 
meant to discourage violations by individuals who have never experienced 
any sanction for them.’”254  These statements were written in defense of 
the deterrence theory supporting the Fourth Amendment exclusionary 
rule, but they apply also to criminal sentencing.255 
How does systemic deterrence work?  The experiments and studies do 
not tell us, so the mechanism is a matter of conjecture.  Perhaps the first 
step is that persons contemplating crime are solidly aware of the criminal 
justice system as a general concept, in that they surely know that police 
officers arrest offenders and that courts convict them, with the result that 
they serve sentences.256  Potential criminals know these things from 
newspapers and television.257  Unfortunately, they probably get most of 
their information from fiction, like the fantasies of John Grisham,258 or 
television dramas like Law & Order.259  The second step is that, not 
knowing the exact sentence for the intended crime, the subject realizes, 
perhaps subconsciously, that he or she must guess at it.260  Third, since 
 
252. Id. at 1016 (majority opinion). 
253. K. Dawn Milan, The Shifting Sands of Deterrence Theory and the Sixth Circuit’s Trouble with 
Suppression in United States v. Fontana, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1426, 1437 (2014). 
254. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 556–57 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 709–10 (1970)). 
255. K. Dawn Milan, supra note 253, at 1437. 
256. See Role of Deterrence, supra note 11, at 1001 (suggesting that mere awareness of the 
likelihood of capture and conviction does deter crime). 
257. Kenneth Dowler, supra note 152, at 109. 
258. See, e.g., JOHN GRISHAM, THE FIRM (1991) (depicting a fictional law firm that kills 
associates who attempt to leave in order to conceal their ties to organized crime).  No one has heard 
of a law firm that kills everyone who gets out, although there might be law firms where the work will 
kill you if you don’t get out.  Grisham’s books are not really about lawyers, but some people get their 
information from them.  See generally JOHN GRISHAM, THE KING OF TORTS (2003) (depicting the life 
of a public defender turned mass torts lawyer who, after becoming rich, loses everything). 
259. Law & Order (Universal Media Studios 1990–2010).  The television show blends police 
procedure and courtroom drama by developing plots “ripped from the headlines,” which people 
relate to.  Law & Order, N.B.C., https://www.nbc.com/law-order?nbc=1 [https://perma.cc/NQF5-
8STV].  
260. See, e.g., Role of Deterrence, supra note 11, at 954 (“The available studies suggest that most 
people do not know the law, that even career criminals who have a special incentive to know it do 
not, and that even when people think they know the law they frequently are wrong.”). 
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research shows that people generally picture the criminal justice system as 
conforming to their own images of what the collective moral code should 
be,261 the offender installs this conception into the factor representing the 
severity of the probable sentence that would result from conviction.262  
Fourth, the potential offender arrives at a probability of conviction 
according to a similarly formed estimate of certainty.263  And finally, he or 
she must decide whether the reward expected from the crime is worth the 
risk.264 
This scenario is highly theoretical, because the research does not 
disclose the stepwise mechanism of the deterrence process.  It is difficult 
to detect the existence of a deterrent, without determining the precise 
thinking of offenders.265  The order of thought may differ from the 
theory set out here, and sometimes, multiple steps may be combined into 
one.266  For example, it may be that the potential criminal imagines a 
guesstimated risk of a potential sentence all in a single idea.  In any event, 
it is usually the system, not the precise sentence likelihood for the 
particular crime, that does the work of deterrence.267 
B.    Offender Conceptions of the Systemic Deterrent 
As has been reported above, the Supreme Court relied upon the 
economic model of deterrence in Gregg v. Georgia.  The death penalty in the 
context of the crime of murder for hire, which was the subject of 
discussion in Gregg, may have been the kind of crime for which the 
economic model could work, because this crime and penalty may have 
furnished the exceptional case in which the potential sentence could be 
anticipated.268  But in the more typical case, it is systemic deterrence that 
 
261. See id. at 1001–02 (“’[P]eople [generally] assume the law is as they think it should be.”). 
262. See id. (noting a person’s preconceived notions of the law, which deviate from what the 
law actually is, minimize the deterrent effect of criminal laws). 
263. See id. at 992–93 (suggesting people’s presumptions of the probability of punishment are 
influenced by the “human tendency to heavily discount a future event”). 
264. Id. at 954. 
265. See Using Sentence Enhancements, supra note 133, at 344 (suggesting most research studies 
measuring the deterrent effects of criminal punishments “are, in practice, joint tests of deterrence and 
incapacitation”). 
266. See Role of Deterrence, supra note 11, at 992–94 (expressing the potential opportunity to 
“improve the system’s ability to make and modulate the threat of punishment” based on probability, 
delay and amount of punishment). 
267. Id. at 951. 
268. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 185–86 (1976). 
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is the more likely effect.269  And ideas of the system come from all sorts 
of sources, including fiction—for better or worse.270 
An example of systemic deterrence being reinforced by fiction can be 
found in the motion picture Thelma and Louise,271 however odd this source 
might appear.  The plot depicts the two women engaging in a crime spree 
that includes multiple episodes, after which, they head for Mexico.272  The 
movie depicts Louise repeatedly pronouncing that she does not want their 
route to go through Texas.273  She does not express her concern explicitly 
in terms of the potential sentence for the women’s crimes in Texas, or for 
that matter, in the states where the crimes were committed.274  Evidently, 
the screenwriters concluded that moviegoers would imagine Texas as a 
place where one encounters severity and certainty of punishment for crime 
(even if the inference may be doubtful),275 and that a movie audience 
would therefore understand Louise’s motivation.  The situation, in other 
words, was one in which viewers would see the existence of systemic 
deterrence. 
One of the confounding factors in systemic deterrence research is that 
people’s reactions to the system are not uniform.276  Because individuals 
have different conceptions of the moral code and different conceptions of 
the justice system, they arrive at different conclusions about both the 
severity and certainty of punishment.277  Thelma acts out this 
phenomenon in the motion picture because she does not share Louise’s 
antipathy to a sojourn through Texas.278  Furthermore, people’s 
 
269. See supra Part IIIA. 
270. See, e.g., THELMA AND LOUISE (Pathé Entertainment 1991) [hereinafter THELMA AND 





275. See Christine Hauser, Teenager Who Made Affluenza Defense in Fatal Crash Is Missing, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/17/us/ethan-couch-missing-texas-
affluenza-case.html [http://perma.cc/F8SD-LNAV] (reporting on an individual in Fort Worth who 
killed four people, was convicted of vehicular manslaughter, argued that his “affluenza”—from 
affluent parents who spared him from learning right from wrong—had caused it, and received 
probation, which he promptly violated by disappearing). 
276. See Role of Deterrence, supra note 11, at 956 (discussing the “cumulative effect” of trying to 
deter crime and how “rage, group arousal, and drug influence” can affect how people perceive a 
penalty as a deterrent). 
277. See id. at 954 (“[T]he ‘hedonic adaptation’ and ‘subjective well-being’ studies suggest that 
one’s standard for judging perceived punitive effect changes over time and conditions.”). 
278. THELMA AND LOUISE, supra note 270. 
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conceptions of the probability of punishment are not stable over time.279  
As is indicated above, it appears that a criminal who has committed and 
repeated the offense begins to discount the certainty of apprehension and 
punishment.280  In addition, people have differing degrees of fear for 
imprisonment of a given length, leading to different susceptibilities to 
deterrence.281 
Perhaps the most interesting question is: how does a person 
contemplating crime form his or her attitude toward the justice system?  
The studies discussed above do not disclose how it happens or from what 
sources the potential criminal’s image is developed.282  If we knew, we 
might be better able to minimize crime through systemic deterrence. 
C.    Can Sentences for One Crime Deter Other Crimes, Including Those That Differ 
Significantly? 
Given the nature of systemic deterrence, maybe sentences for robbery 
can deter other crimes such as burglary.283  Maybe sentences for robbery 
can even exert some minimizing effect on crimes of distant character, such 
as driving while intoxicated.284  If the estimates of potential sentences 
arrived at by potential criminals are indeed products of the criminal justice 
system as a whole, rather than of particular statutes or practices, there is no 
reason to conclude that deterrence cannot result across the range of crimes 
from punishments of a given crime.285 
A remarkable series of six experiments by Keizer and others286 in the 
Netherlands provides support for the idea.287  The closest of these 
experiments to the situation of the potential criminal tested whether visible 
violation of norms (and presumably laws) against littering and graffiti, 
 
279. Role of Deterrence, supra note 11, at 954. 
280. Id. 
281. See id. (denoting studies that show law makers cannot control how people react to 
sentences simply by altering the length of time imposed). 
282. See, e.g., id. at 954–55 (explaining the establishment of severe penalties for crimes is not 
the most effective way to deter one from committing crimes). 
283. See, e.g., id. at 951 (“Having a punishment system does deter.  But there is growing 
evidence to suggest skepticism about the criminal law’s deterrent effect—that is, skepticism about the 
ability to deter crime through the manipulation of criminal law rules and penalties.”). 
284. Id. at 967–69. 
285. Id. at 978–83. 
286. Kees Keizer et al., The Spreading of Disorder, 322 SCIENCE 1681 (2008). 
287. See generally id. (presenting experiments proving a person who observes another 
committing a crime is more likely to also commit a crime leading to the spreading of disorder). 
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committed with apparent impunity, produced more instances of theft than 
a clean environment.288  The researchers’ basic device for this experiment 
was a five-euro bill sticking partially out of an addressed envelope, which 
was placed so that the envelope protruded from a mailbox with the five 
euros placed visibly, so that they were easy to remove.289  The researchers 
created three surrounding environments, two that featured an abundance 
of litter or graffiti, and one that was free of these signs of disorder.290  An 
observer recorded the results.291  The hypothesis was that more theft 
would occur in the litter-graffiti environments, and the results, as the 
authors put it, were “dramatic.”292  More than twice the percentage of 
subjects stole the five-euro note in the graffiti condition than in the clean 
environment, 27% versus 13%.293  The experimenters reported even 
more striking results in the littered environment, where 25% stole the bill 
as compared to 13% in the clean condition.294 
This experiment provides strong support for the systemic deterrent 
theory, even though the support is indirect because it did not involve 
punishments.295  The subjects may have acted as they did because they 
perceived, in the littered-graffiti condition, that their performance would 
not have affected the disorder around them.296  Or, they may have 
concluded that “everyone behaves badly.”297  Experimenters wrote, “Our 
conclusion is that, as a certain norm-violating behavior becomes more 
common, it will negatively influence conformity to other norms and 
rules.”298  But these mechanisms for the result are related to the degree of 
enforcement of the relevant norm, and the experiment shows that 
unattended and unpunished violations of one norm—such as littering or 
 
288. Id. at 1683. 
289. Id. at 1684. 
290. Id. 
291. Id. 
292. Id. at 1683–84. 
293. Id. at 1684. 
294. Id. 
295. See id. at 1684–5 (analyzing the effect of exposing people to acceptable courses of 
conduct and concluding that increased rule-breaking behavior will “negatively influence” rule-
following attitudes). 
296. See id. at 1684 (providing experiments supporting correlation between a person who 
observes another individual committing a crime will likely commit a crime themselves, leading to the 
spreading of disorder). 
297. Id. at 1684–85. 
298. Id. at 1684. 
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graffiti—do create other kinds of law violations, including the presumably 
worse crime or theft, in this case.299 
The experiment supports the so-called broken windows theory 
advanced by George L. Kelling and put into effect by Mayor Rudy Giuliani 
in New York City.300  The theory is that disorder and crime that are 
unaddressed increase the incidence of more serious crime.301  Thus, 
relatively minor offenses, such as vandalism and aggressive panhandling, 
give rise to more serious crimes, and suppression of the lesser offenses 
deters the greater.302  The theory remains controversial, although New 
York experienced a reduction in crime after putting it in place,303 and the 
experiments of Keizer, Lindenberg, and Steg support it.304 
The theory of systemic deterrence is agreed to by multiple 
commentators,305 and gives rise to intriguing possibilities.  For example, 
the relative non-enforcement of immigration laws may create a catalyst for 
increases in all kinds of crimes—not just immigration crimes, and not just 
by immigrants.306  The systemic deterrence theory may mean a reduction 
in other crimes would result from immigration law enforcement, including, 
perhaps, a decrease in robbery and burglary by non-immigrants.  Of 
course, this solution would be limited by resources as well as 
considerations of fairness and humanitarianism.  But enforcement of 
enhancements for immigration crimes, so that multiple-time deportees 
 
299. See generally Kees Keizer et al., supra note 286 (concluding small crimes, such as littering, 
can make people more comfortable committing larger crimes, such as stealing). 
300. Christina Sterbenz, How New York City Became Safe Again, BUSINESS INSIDER (Aug. 20, 





304. See generally Kees Keizer et al., supra note 286 (evaluating research findings indicating that 
the observance of a crime will likely lead an individual to commit a crime themselves, in turn leading 
to further societal unrest). 
305. See Role of Deterrence, supra note 11, at 1001 (“We do not dispute that having a criminal 
justice system that imposes punishment can and does deter violations.”); see also Daniel S. Nagin, 
supra note 244, at 1 (introducing four impediments in assessing the effectiveness of policy actions on 
the deterrence of crime). 
306. See United States v. Corchado-Aguirre, No. CR 15–0393 JB, 2015 WL 10383207, at *18 
(D.N.M. Aug. 31, 2015) (arguing a failure to enforce immigration laws implies to potential offenders 
that violating the laws of the United States is “not a big deal”). 
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would be meaningfully punished,307 together with serious action against 
immigrants convicted of offenses, might suppress crime generally. 
Then, there is the issue of deterrence by severe penalties.  The Supreme 
Court’s speculation in Gregg may have been too modest.  Systemic 
deterrence might well mean that serious sentences for serious crimes have 
far-reaching effects.308  Vigorous enforcement of laws against the most 
serious crimes, especially if done in a manner visible enough to capture 
public attention, may have an across-the-board deterrent effect against 
crimes of all kinds.309 
IV.    CONCLUSION 
A legislature that hopes to deter repetition of a particular kind of crime 
by increasing sentences is likely engaged in a losing venture.310  The 
experiments appear to show that longer sentences usually do not deter 
crime.311  Certainty of detection, apprehension, conviction, and sentence 
type, by most accounts, has a greater deterrent effect than severity of 
sentence.312  Instead, therefore, the legislature would have greater success 
if it increased the criminal’s risk of getting caught and punished.313  This 
solution is more difficult because it requires consideration of the entire 
criminal justice system so that impediments to certainty of punishment can 
be reduced.314  In many instances, a buildup of police forces in 
appropriate roles and places will do more to reduce crime than funds spent 
on longer prison terms.315  In other cases, the pressure point may be the 
adequacy of courts to handle arrestees, so that increases in the number of 
 
307. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1996) (outlining the process and criminal penalties for reentry of a 
removed alien). 
308. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (providing one function of capital 
punishment is to deter committing capital crimes). 
309. But see Accepting the Null Hypothesis, supra note 34, at 143 (hypothesizing an increase in 
sentence severity has no impact on deterring crimes). 
310. See id. (“[V]ariation in the severity of sanctions is unrelated to levels of crime . . . .”). 
311. See generally Accepting the Null Hypothesis, supra note 34. 
312. See generally Roy E. L. Watson, supra note 40 (conducting a study that analyzed the effect 
of other methods of deterrence than sentencing or fines). 
313. See id. at 293 (“[T]he rate of compliance gradually declined as motorists recognized that 
the risk of apprehension was small.”). 
314. See id. (presenting an experiment wherein an increase in the certainty of punishment for 
traffic violations led to a fifty percent reduction in the number of “customary offenders”). 
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judges will reduce crime more than increases in the lengths of sentences 
they can impose.316 
But the picture is not one-sided.  There probably are situations in which 
increases in sentences will reduce crime.  In the first place, the primacy of 
certainty over severity probably depends upon the existence of at least a 
minimum quantum of punishment to work the desired deterrent.  In 
addition, increases in sentences targeted at groups who are likely to know 
of the increases probably create a measurable deterrent effect.  The 
essential factor, which has been largely ignored until recently, is 
perception.317  Would-be criminals cannot respond to individual 
sentences unless they know the particulars, which is too much to expect in 
the ordinary case.318 
In addition to perception, there is the factor of delay.  A long lead time 
reduces the deterrent.  If the basic formula is that a deterrent effect exists 
if C x S > R, other factors being equal, the introduction of delay, D, into 
the process probably divides the product of C and S and therefore reduces 
the deterrent.  People simply do not respond to the possibility of negative 
events that may occur a year or five years from now in the same manner in 
which they respond to events that will occur today.  The effect of delay 
upon deterrence should be the subject of more study. 
The C x S formula should also be adjusted to account for indirect and 
extralegal effects, including what is known as condemnation.319  The actor 
himself may decide against crime by reason of his or her own distaste for 
the act, or may do so because engaging in the course of conduct will create 
adverse reactions among family or friends, or may create disadvantages in 
future endeavors, such as employment or education.320  If the 
discouragement from crime is produced this way—by the act itself—the 
deterrent is extralegal and is not dependent on the criminal justice 
 
316. Irving R. Kaufman, Sentencing: The Judge’s Problem, ATLANTIC ONLINE (Jan. 1960), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/unbound/flashbks/death/kaufman.htm [http://perma.cc/ 
SQH6-LXDQ] (“[I]n New York, a single judge may pass sentence on ten or more defendants in a 
day.  Often, sentencing occupies a large portion of the court day”). 
317. See generally Perceptual Research on General Deterrence, supra note 64 (positing studies of 
deterrence have not recognized the complex nature of the perceptual process). 
318. Cf. id. at 547–49 (supporting the notion that perceptions of particular risks have causal 
relevance to behavior). 
319. See IMMANUEL KANT, supra note 20, at 568 (explaining why the principle of equality 
should be taken into account when determining punishment). 
320. Perceptual Research on General Deterrence, supra note 64, at 564–65. 
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system.321  Or, the potential criminal may refrain from wrongdoing 
because of conscience inculcated by the criminal justice system, or the 
expectation of strained relations with friends and family from arrest, or the 
prospect that arrest or conviction may inhibit future endeavors.322  These 
are indirect deterrents created by the criminal justice system. 
In either case, these effects create deterrents that operate in addition to 
the threat of punishment.323  In some cases, they may add enough to 
justify seemingly lenient treatment by the law.  Thus, a jurisdiction in 
which marijuana possession is illegal, wanting to retain that principle, 
might dispense with formal punishment and treat a first offense with 
ticketing rather than arrest, coupled with a required educational 
program.324 
For dangerous crimes or those subject to repetition, it should be 
remembered that incapacitation provides a separate means of crime 
reduction.325  It is often difficult to discern whether a reduction in crime 
is due to deterrence or to incapacitation.326  Even relatively short 
sentences—say, three to five years for armed robbery—will prevent crimes 
by the convicts who are confined, in addition to prevention by whatever 
deterrent effect they have.327  The most difficult part of using 
incapacitative sentences is the difficulty of predicting future dangerousness 
or recidivism.328  In general, sentences purely for incapacitation are likely 
to be appropriate in cases of serious violent crime, such as robbery, rape or 
murder, or for lesser crimes that are often repeated, such as the property 
crimes that often trigger three-strikes laws.329 
Overall, the message is that sentences for particular crimes are not 
usually what deters.  But there is a deterrent effect, because instead, it is 
 
321. Id. at 563. 
322. Id. at 564–65. 
323. See id. at 562–63 (outlining extralegal sanctions that function as deterrents to crime). 
324. St. John Barned-Smith, supra note 127. 




329. See Role of Deterrence, supra note 11, at 964 (discussing how three-strike laws targeting 
repeat offenders have positive effects on the community by locking up dangerous criminals); see also 
‘Three Strikes’ Sentencing Laws, supra note 197 (recognizing the primary focus of the “Three Strikes” 
laws is to contain recidivism). 
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the criminal justice system as a whole that deters.330  The effect might be 
called systemic deterrence.331  Although the mechanism of this process is 
not well understood, it probably begins with the non-acquaintance of the 
person contemplating commission of an offense with precise crime and 
sentence definitions.  But that person is well aware of the justice system, at 
least to the extent of knowing police officers arrest offenders and courts 
sentence them upon conviction.  The next step may come about because 
most people, surveys show, imagine that the system conforms to their own 
conceptions of a common moral code.332  They install those conceptions 
as their expectations of the results of committing crime.333  And in this 
manner, they feel the effects of deterrence not from statutes defining 
sentence lengths, but from the system as a whole, as systemic 
deterrence.334 
These conclusions may bring about some intriguing possibilities.  If it is 
the system as a whole that deters, meaningfully severe sentences for one 
given crime may, through condemnation, add to the understanding of this 
common morality.  Indirectly, they may increase the effect of systemic 
deterrence.  Furthermore, there is no reason that sentences for one given 
crime cannot deter others, given the existence of systemic deterrence, and 
indeed the experiments suggest that this result will follow.335  Serious 
sentences for murder or robbery, for example, probably deter other 
 
330. See Role of Deterrence, supra note 11, at 1001 (“The system’s generalized threat of 
punishment provides a clear disincentive to crime.”); Daniel S. Nagin, supra note 244, at 2 
(recognizing the criminal justice system has “an overall crime deterrent effect of great magnitude”). 
331. See Role of Deterrence, supra note 11, at 1001 (explaining systemic deterrence as the method 
by which the mere existence of the criminal justice system “provides a clear disincentive to crime”); 
Daniel S. Nagin, supra note 244, at 1 (arguing the criminal justice system as a whole deters potential 
law breakers). 
332. Chris Gowans, Moral Relativism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY ARCHIVE 
(Feb. 19, 2004), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/moral-relativism [http:// 
perma.cc/8CB4-W6WY]. 
333. Id. 
334. See Role of Deterrence, supra note 11, at 1001 (arguing it is the criminal justice system as a 
whole and not “the manipulation of rules for determining liability and punishment” that deters 
potential offenders); see also Daniel S. Nagin, supra note 244, at 1 (“The criminal justice system 
threatens punishment to law breakers—through the police power to arrest and investigate, the 
judicial power to adjudicate and sentence, and the corrections agencies’ power to administer 
punishments.”). 
335. See Role of Deterrence, supra note 11, at 951 (“The general existence of the system may well 
deter prohibited conduct, but the formulation of criminal law rules within the system, according to a 
deterrence-optimizing analysis, may have a limited effect or even no effect beyond what the system’s 
broad deterrent warning has already achieved.”). 
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offenses, such as burglary, theft, or assault.  Thus, visible sentences for the 
most serious crimes may decrease the incidence of other crimes across the 
penal code, through the mechanism of systemic deterrence.  But the 
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